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Abstract
This paper revisits the resource curse paradox and studies the impact of resource
rents and their volatility on economic growth under varying institutional quality. Using
ve-year non-overlapping observations between 1970 and 2005 for 112 countries, we
nd that while resource rents enhance real output per capita, their volatility exerts
a negative impact on economic growth. Therefore, we argue that volatility, rather
than abundance per se, drives the resource curse. However, we also nd that higher
institutional quality can help o¤set some of the negative volatility e¤ects of resource
rents. Therefore, resource abundance can be a blessing provided that growth and
welfare enhancing policies and institutions are adopted.
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1 Introduction
According to the resource curse paradox, resource rich countries perform poorly when com-
pared to countries which are not endowed with oil, natural gas, minerals and other non-
renewable resources. Therefore, resource abundance is believed to be an important determi-
nant of economic failure. This paper explores whether the abundance of natural resources in
itself is a curse or whether instead the negative growth e¤ects observed in many resource-rich
economies could be due to the price volatility in commodity markets. It will also investigate
whether there is a role for institutions in o¤setting some of the negative e¤ects of volatility.
There are di¤erent explanations for why resource rich economies might be subject to
this curse. Dutch disease (see Corden and Neary (1982), Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986),
and Krugman (1987)) is one of the channels through which the resource curse makes itself
felt: an increase in natural resource revenue leads to an appreciation of the real exchange
rate, which negatively a¤ects the protability of the manufacturing sector. Economic growth
is then adversely a¤ected by the resulting re-allocation of resources from the high-tech and
high-skill manufacturing sector to the low-tech and low-skill natural resource sector. Another
explanation for the resource curse paradox focuses on the political economy considerations
and argues that large windfalls from oil and other resources create incentives for the rent-
seeking activities that involve corruption (Mauro (1995) and Leite and Weidmann (1999)),
voracity (Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999)), and possibly civil conicts
(Collier and Hoe­ er (2004)). Some of these considerations have been recently formalized by
Caselli and Cunningham (2009) where they attempt to characterize conditions under which
an increase in the size of the resource rent leads to a decrease in real output, the so called
"natural resource curse" hypothesis.1
Empirical support for the resource curse was originally provided by Sachs and Warner
(1995) who showed the existence of a negative relationship between real GDP growth per
capita and di¤erent measures of resource abundance, such as the ratio of resource exports to
GDP, even when controlling for institutional quality. However, the empirical evidence on the
resource curse paradox is rather mixed. Most papers in the literature tend to follow Sachs
and Warners cross-sectional specication introducing new explanatory variables for resource
dependence/abundance, while others derive theoretical models that are loosely related to
their empirical specication. Some of these papers conrm Sachs and Warners results (see
Rodriguez and Sachs (1999), Gylfason et al. (1999), and Bulte et al. (2005) among others).
An important drawback of these studies with few exceptions, however, is their measure of
resource abundance. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) argue that the so-called resource curse
does not exist when one uses the correct measure of resource abundance in regressions. They
also show that while resource dependence, when instrumented in growth regressions, does
not a¤ect growth, resource abundance in fact positively a¤ects economic growth.
There are also a number of other grounds on which the econometric evidence of the nega-
tive e¤ects of resource abundance on growth may be questioned, see Cavalcanti et al. (2009)
for an extensive discussion. For instance, the cross-sectional estimation method usually em-
ployed in the literature su¤er from omitted variable and endogeneity problems among other
1See Sachs and Warner (1995) and Rosser (2006) for an extensive examination of these prominent accounts
of the natural resource curse paradox.
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things. Accounting for these shortcomings and using appropriate econometric techniques,
the recent empirical literature seems to provide evidence against the conventional resource
curse literature and argues for the positive e¤ect of resource abundance on development
and growth, see for instance Arezki and van der Ploeg (2007), Cavalcanti et al. (2009),
and Esfahani et al. (2009). Moreover, while Cavalcanti et al. (2011b) and van der Ploeg
and Poelhekke (2010) show a direct positive e¤ect of resource abundance on growth, they
provide evidence for the negative relationship between resource volatility and growth. Cav-
alcanti et al. (2011b) also demonstrate that volatility exerts a negative impact on economic
growth operating mainly through lower accumulation of physical capital.
Several recent empirical works have also focused on the mitigating role of institutions.
Using a cross-sectional approach, Mehlum et al. (2006) and Béland and Tiagi (2009) show
that the impact of natural resources on growth and development depends primarily on insti-
tutions, while Boschini et al. (2007) illustrate that the type of natural resources possessed is
also an important factor. These authors argue that when controlling for institutional quality,
and including an interaction term between institutional quality and resource abundance, a
threshold e¤ect arises. Therefore there are levels of institutional quality above which resource
abundance becomes growth enhancing.
In this paper we investigate the impact of natural resource rents and their volatility on
growth using a panel of data on 112 countries and ve-year non-overlapping observations
between 1970 and 2005. The estimation results conrm that, in contrast to the predictions
of the resource curse and dutch disease literature, a higher growth rate of resource rents sig-
nicantly raises economic growth. In addition, our empirical ndings also reveal a signicant
negative e¤ect of rent volatility on output growth. Therefore, we argue that it is volatility,
rather than abundance per se, that drives the resource curse paradox. Furthermore, using
data on institutional quality, our results illustrate that better institutions can o¤set some of
the negative e¤ects of rent volatility. Therefore, our ndings contrast with other studies on
the role of institutions in resource abundant economies, which maintain that the abundance
itself is a curse.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 describes the data used in our
analysis. In Section 3 we transform our annual data to ve-year non-overlapping averages
and employ the system GMM methodology to estimate the e¤ects of resource rent growth
and volatility on cross country real output per capita growth. We then investigate the role
of institutions. Finally, Section 4 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 Data
To empirically test the relationship between economic growth and resource rent as well
as rent volatility, we use annual data from 1970 to 2005 on real GDP per capita, a rent
measure based on the prices, cost of production and quantities of 13 commodities, and other
important determinants of growth such as investment share of GDP, human capital, trade
openness, government burden, and lack of price stability.2 Since we are also interested in
2In the growth literature government burden is dened as the ratio of government consumption to GDP
while lack of price stability is dened as log(100 + ination rate), see for instance Aghion et al. (2009).
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testing whether or not better institutions can o¤set the negative growth e¤ects of resource
rents, we use a measure of institutional quality described in more detail below.
Our data set covers 112 countries, see Table 1, the number for which both rent and
institutional quality data is available. Out of these countries 27 are on the African continent,
18 are located in Latin America and 12 can be found in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region. Our sample also includes 32 out of the 34 OECD countries and 8 out of
the 12 of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Thus our sample
is very comprehensive.
To lter out business cycle uctuations and to focus on the long-run growth e¤ects of
resource rent and volatility, we follow the literature in transforming the annual series into
non-overlapping ve-year averages. Given that the time span of our dataset is 1970-2005,
we can construct an unbalanced panel with a maximum of seven ve-yearly observations per
country. A more detailed description of the data and their sources are provided in Table 2.
2.1 Resource Rent






where Pj;t is the price of commodity j in year t in US dollars, Cj;it is the average cost of
production (Qj;it) of commodity j in country i, Lit is the population in country i, and Dt
is the US GDP deator used to convert the nominal values of rent into real terms. M
represents the 13 commodities that are included in our measure for resource rent. Three of
which provide around 88 percent of total energy consumption in the world: oil, natural gas
and coal, and ten of which are minerals: bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin,
zinc, gold, and silver.
This measure of rent allows countries to be inuenced by changes in commodity prices
di¤erently, depending not only on their production levels but also on the average cost of
extraction. Equation (1) is used to construct two important variables. The rst one is the
growth rate of rents and the second is a measure of rent volatility, both are explained in
more detail below.
Rent growth is calculated as the annual log di¤erences in Rit, that is:
gR;it = lnRit   lnRit 1 (2)
Resource rent or revenue has been used extensively in a number of recent studies in the
resource curse literature as a measure of abundance, see for instance Brunnschweiler and
Bulte (2008), Cavalcanti et al. (2011a), and Collier and Hoe­ er (2009). Note that the rent
measure in equation (1), and its growth rate in equation (2), portrait a countrys ability
to extract its stock of natural wealth and make use of the proceeds and so is indeed an
appropriate measure of abundance.
In contrast to most studies in the growth literature which employ time-invariant measures
of volatility, we construct a time-varying measure. We consider the ve year non-overlapping
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where S = 4 as we are working with ve-year averages. The volatility of gR;it, indicates the
extent to which resource rent growth deviates from a given mean at any point in time.
The left-hand graph in Figure 1 illustrate a simple bivariate relationship between GDP
per capita growth and rent growth over the entire period 1970-2005, suggesting a positive
correlation between these two variables. On the other hand, from the right-hand graph,
we observe that higher rent volatility is associated with lower GDP growth. Overall, the
results from Figure 1 represent preliminary evidence that while resource abundance does not
reduce output per capita growth (contrary to the resource curse hypothesis), the volatility
of rents stunts output growth. In Section 3 we will add a whole range of control variables
and deal with possible endogeneity problems through the system GMM approach to examine
whether the above results survive. We will also investigate whether the negative e¤ects of
rent volatility can be o¤set for countries with good institutional qualities.
2.2 Institutional Quality
Good economic institutions, as described in Acemoglu et al. (2005), should reect a stronger
rule of law, well-dened property rights and robust checks and balances. To capture these
characteristics Sachs and Warner (1995) and Mehlum et al. (2006) use the institutional
quality index, based on data from the Political Risk Services Group, in their cross-sectional
analysis. This index is an unweighted average of ve indices covering: (i) rule of law,
(ii) bureaucratic quality, (iii) government corruption, (iv) risk of expropriation, and (v)
government repudiation of contracts. However, this data is only available from 1984, and
given that we would lose information for 3 out of the 7 non-overlapping ve-year averages, we
will not make use of this index. Another popular measure frequently used in the literature to
represent institutional quality is the POLITY2 variable from the Polity IV: Regime Authority
Characteristics and Transitions Datasets, see for instance Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010)
and Collier and Hoe­ er (2009). This index measures how democratic a country is on a scale
from 0 to 10, but does not take into account other institutional qualities such as the rule of
law which is identied to be important for economic growth and development.
In this paper we use the Fraser chain-linked index (hereafter known as Fraser) as our
measure of institutional quality, which is also the preferred measure in Béland and Tiagi
(2009). This index contains panel data over the years 1970-2008 covering ve appropriate
areas: (1) size of government: expenditures, taxes, and enterprises, (2) legal structure and
security of property rights, (3) access to sound money, (4) freedom to trade internationally,
and (5) regulation of credit, labor, and business, for more detail see Gwartney et al. (2010).
Using this index, which is rated on a scale of 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest), provides more precise
estimates of the growth impact of economic institutions and their interaction with natural
resources. We also specically estimated our model using the chain-linked index covering
the second area only (Fraser 2) since legal structure is purported to be a key determinant in
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reducing rent-seeking motives. The Fraser index is not only a more comprehensive measure
of institutions than those used in earlier studies, but given that we utilize panel data rather
than cross-sectional averages, we do not lose information in the process of averaging the
data, as is often done in the resource curse literature.
Table 3 reports average values of the Fraser and Fraser 2 indices for the whole sample
as well as some selected regions. As expected, while the OECD countries have the highest
level of institutions as measured by both indices, the 27 African countries have on average
the lowest ranking in terms of the Fraser index while the same is true for the OPEC subset
when it comes to the Fraser 2 index.
3 Empirical Results
In this section we rst investigate whether abundance of natural resources by itself is a
determinant of economic failure or whether the lack of growth in commodity abundant
economies can be attributed to the volatility in rents. We then look at the role of institutions
in dampening and potentially o¤setting the negative e¤ects of rents.
3.1 Volatility and Growth
To correct for the biases created by lagged endogenous variables and the simultaneity of
growth determinants, we follow Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
in employing the system generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimator developed for
dynamic panel data models. But as the two-step standard errors on estimated coe¢ cients
will be biased downward in small samples like ours, we make use of Windmeijer (2005)
approach to correct for that bias. The following equation is then estimated:
yis = (  1) yis 1 + 1gR;is + 2R;is + 3Iis
+0zis + i + s + "is; (4)
where i = 1; 2; :::; N , and s = 1; 2; :::; S, in which S = T
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, with T denoting the years between
1970 and 2005. yis is the average growth rate of real GDP per capita between dates s and
s 1; yis 1 is the logarithm of real GDP per capita at the beginning of each period; gR;is is the
growth rate of real rent per capita; and R;is is its volatility. Iis is a measure of institutional
quality and zis is a set of other control variables now standard in the growth literature3
including education and the investment share of GDP. s is the time-specic e¤ect; i is the
country-specic e¤ect; and "is is the error term.
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the impact of resource rent growth and volatility
as well as institutional quality on GDP per capita growth. In the rst regression, [1:1], we
observe that an increase in gR is both growth enhancing and highly signicant. Including
volatility of rents in regression [1:2], we nd that while the coe¢ cient of gR remains positive
and signicant R has a statistically signicant negative e¤ect on output growth. These
results, 1 > 0 and 2 < 0 , survive even when we control for institutional quality using the
Fraser index, regression [1:3], as well as the Fraser 2 index, regression [1:4].
3See, for instance, Levine et al. (2000), Mehlum et al. (2006), and Aghion et al. (2009).
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The positive growth e¤ect of gR is in line with the results obtained in a number of recent
studies in the literature, such as Arezki and van der Ploeg (2007), Brunnschweiler and Bulte
(2008), and Cavalcanti et al. (2009), and provides evidence against the traditional resource
curse hypothesis, which argues that it is the level of resource abundance that a¤ects economic
growth negatively. Therefore, the overall evidence in Table 4 suggests that the source of the
resource curse is the volatility of rents as opposed to resource abundance. Further evidence
for the negative growth e¤ect of the volatility channel is provided in van der Ploeg and
Poelhekke (2010) and Cavalcanti et al. (2011b).
Regressions [1:3] and [1:4] aim to test the impact of institutional quality on real GDP per
capita growth using the Fraser chain-linked index in [1:3] as well as a more specic measure
of legal structure (Fraser 2) in [1:4]. As expected 3 is statistically signicant and positive in
both regressions, implying that better institutions enhance real GDP growth. In addition,
there is evidence of income convergence across countries in our sample as the coe¢ cient on
the lagged dependent variable is both negative and signicant in all regressions.
To test the validity of the instruments and therefore consistency of the GMM estimator,
we consider two specication tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and
Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). The rst is a Hansen test of over-identifying
restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments and the second test examines
the hypothesis that the error term "is is not serially correlated.4 As can be seen from
Table 4 the Hansen and second order serial correlation test statistics are all well above the
conventional signicance levels, therefore, the instruments used are valid.
3.2 Impact of Institutions on Volatility
To investigate whether institutional quality can help o¤set some of the negative growth e¤ects
of rent volatility, we follow Mehlum et al. (2006) and Boschini et al. (2007) and introduce
an interaction term in our regressions. As before, we use the system GMM dynamic panel
data approach to estimate the following equation:
yis = (  1) yis 1 + 1gR;is + 2R;is + 3Iis + 4 [R;is  Iis]
+0zis + i + s + "is; (5)
where R;is  Iis is the interaction term between resource rent volatility and institutional
quality, and all other variables are as dened in equation (4). Regressions [1:1] to [1:4]
illustrated that 2 < 0, and given our hypothesis that 4 is positive, the total impact of rent
volatility, 2 + 4Iis, is increasingly negative the lower a countrys institutional quality. In
addition, a threshold e¤ect arises if 2 and 4 have opposite signs, that is:
@yis
@R;is
= 2 + 4Iis > 0 =) Iis = bI =  24 : (6)
Table 5 presents the result of the estimations carried out with the interaction term,
which echo those obtained in Table 4. We observe that in contrast to the predictions of
4We test whether the di¤erenced error term is second-order serially correlated as by construction, it is
most likely rst-order serially correlated even if the original error term is not.
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the resource curse hypothesis, a higher growth rate of resource rents enhance real output
per capita growth signicantly while higher volatility leads to lower growth. These ndings
are consistent with the ones obtained in regressions [1:1] and [1:4] and with the evidence
that is provided in the recent literature on the resource curse hypothesis, which argues that
abundance of resources is not a curse and could even under certain conditions be a blessing.
As expected the coe¢ cient of the interaction term, 4, is both positive and signicant
regardless of which institutional quality measure is used. Therefore the better institutions
an economy has the less adversely it is a¤ected by rent volatility. Using the estimates for
2 and 4 in Table 5 and given that the Fraser indices are on a scale from 0 to 10, we can
calculate the minimum institutional quality, i.e. the threshold value, required to turn the
marginal e¤ect of volatility to zero using equation (6). The implied threshold for regressions
[2:1] and [2:2] is 5.61 and 5.81 respectively, see Table 5.
Our results are in line with those in Mehlum et al. (2006) and Boschini et al. (2007),
who argue that better institutions help o¤set the negative growth e¤ects of natural resources.
But as opposed to their cross-sectional studies the evidence in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that
it is the volatility in rents, rather than abundance per se, which drives the resource curse.
Regression [2:3] and [2:4] test the robustness of our results, especially the interaction term,
in presence of other control variables that are usually included in Barro-type regressions. As
can be seen the sign, magnitude, and signicance levels of resource rent growth and its
volatility as well as the interaction term remain fairly similar to those in regressions [2:1]
and [2:2], thus providing evidence for the robustness of our results. The implied threshold
value is now 5.82 using the Fraser index and 5.99 using the Fraser 2 index, which is slightly
larger than before.
Using the higher threshold value for the Fraser index (5.82) we see that except for the
OECD countries all other countries fall below this value and so will not have the su¢ cient
institutional quality needed to completely o¤set the adverse e¤ects from rent volatility, see
Table 3. On the other hand, no matter which threshold value we use for the Fraser 2 index
(5.81 or 5.99) all countries outside the OECD subset have signicantly lower value than this.
In fact, the average Fraser 2 value for the whole sample at 5.44 is well below both threshold
values. Therefore, on average the 112 countries in our sample do not have the su¢ cient
institutional quality, as measured by legal structure and security of property rights, to o¤set
the negative impact of resource rent volatility entirely.
Overall our results suggest that when institutional quality is high, volatility of resource
rents is less output-reducing. This is likely because countries with better economic institu-
tions can set up transparent, accountable, and forward-looking government bodies to invest
their rents appropriately and control rent-seeking motives, which are likely to increase under
greater uncertainty as agents become more interested in short term benets. In addition,
prudent governance embodied in good institutions will encourage the invest of current re-
source rents in productive capital such as education, and ensure credible checks and balances
to eschew excessive borrowing and private abuse of rents.
As before, we have income convergence across countries. Moreover, the Hansen and the
second order serial correlation test statistics in the four regressions in Table 5 conrm the




Using panel data on 112 countries between 1970 and 2005, this paper has examined the
e¤ects of resource rents and their volatility on GDP per capita growth under varying insti-
tutional arrangements. We used a system GMM dynamic panel estimator to deal with the
simultaneity problem as well as the omitted variable bias, which is not dealt with by the
current literature on the resource curse and institutional quality.
While the traditional resource curse hypothesis predicts a negative e¤ect of resource
abundance on growth, our results show the contrary: resource abundance, as proxied by
real resource rent per capita growth, has a positive impact on output growth. However, we
nd strong evidence for the negative growth e¤ects of resource rent volatility. Therefore,
we argue that volatility, rather than abundance per se, drives the resource curse paradox.
Moreover, we contributed to the existing literature by showing that countries with good
institutional arrangements can o¤set some of the negative impacts of rent volatility. As
such, resource abundance can be a blessing provided that growth and welfare enhancing
policies and institutions are adopted.
Resource-rich countries can improve the management of volatility in resource income by
setting up forward-looking institutions such as SovereignWealth Funds (if they have substan-
tial revenues from their exports), or adopting short-term mechanisms such as stabilization
funds with the aim of saving when commodity prices are high and spending accumulated
revenues when prices are low. The government can also intervene in the economy by in-
creasing public capital expenditure when private investment is low, using proceeds from
the stabilization fund. Alternatively the government can use these funds to increase the
complementarities of physical and human capital, such as improving the judicial system,
property rights, and human capital. This would increase the returns on investment with
positive e¤ects on capital accumulation, TFP, and growth. Improving the functioning of
nancial markets is also a crucial step as this allows rms and households to insure against
shocks, decreasing uncertainty and therefore mitigating the negative e¤ects of volatility on
investment and economic growth.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: List of the 112 Countries in the Sample
Albania Dominican Republic Korea Romania
Algeria Ecuador Kuwait Russia
Argentina Egypt Latvia Rwanda
Australia El Salvador Lithuania Senegal
Austria Estonia Madagascar Sierra Leone
Bahrain, Kingdom of Fiji Malawi Slovak Republic
Bangladesh Finland Malaysia Slovenia
Belgium France Mali South Africa
Benin Gabon Mauritius Spain
Bolivia Germany Mexico Sri Lanka
Botswana Ghana Morocco Sweden
Brazil Greece Namibia Switzerland
Bulgaria Guatemala Nepal Syrian Arab Republic
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Netherlands Tanzania
Cameroon Guyana New Zealand Thailand
Canada Haiti Nicaragua Togo
Central African Rep. Honduras Niger Trinidad and Tobago
Chad Hungary Nigeria Tunisia
Chile India Norway Turkey
China, Peoples Rep. of Indonesia Oman Uganda
Colombia Iran, I.R. of Pakistan Ukraine
Congo, Dem. Rep Ireland Panama United Arab Emirates
Costa Rica Israel Papua New Guinea United Kingdom
Côte dIvoire Italy Paraguay United States
Croatia Jamaica Peru Uruguay
Cyprus Japan Philippines Venezuela, Rep. Bol.
Czech Republic Jordan Poland Zambia
Denmark Kenya Portugal Zimbabwe
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Table 2: Denitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Denition and Construction Source
Real GDP per Capita Ratio of gross domestic product (GDP)
(in 2005 US dollars) to population.
GDP per Capita Growth Log di¤erence of real GDP per capita. Authorsconstruction using data from
Heston et al. (2009) and
Initial GDP per Capita Initial value of the ratio of GDP World Bank (2010) World
(in 2005 US dollars) to population. Development Indicators (WDI).
Investment Ratio of real gross domestic investment
to real GDP.
Real Resource Rent Energy and mineral resource rent per capita
per Capita deated using the US GDP deator.
Authorscalculation using data from
Real Resource Rent Log di¤erence of real resource rent per capita. the World Bank (2010) WDI.
per Capita Growth
Volatility of Real Standard deviation of real resource rent per
Resource Rent per Capita capita growth in a ve-year interval.
Fraser Index A chain-linked index of:
(1) size of the government;
(2) legal structure and security of property rights;
(3) access to sound money; Data from Gwartney et al. (2010)
(4) freedom to trade internationally; Economic Freedom of the World Dataset.
(5) regulation of credit, labor, and business.
Fraser 2 Index A chain-linked index covering legal structure and
and security of property rights.
Education Ratio of total secondary enrollment to the Authorsconstruction using data from
population of the age group that o¢ cially World Bank (2010) WDI and
corresponds to that level of education. UNESCO (2010) UIS.
Trade Openness Ratio of Exports and Imports to GDP. Authorsconstruction using data from
the World Bank (2010) WDI.
Government Burden Ratio of government consumption to GDP.
CPI Consumer price index (2005=100).
Authors calculations using data from
Ination rate Annual percentage change in CPI. the World Bank (2010) WDI.
Lack of Price Stability log(100+ination rate).
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Volatility of Resource Rent
Notes: Average GDP per capita growth is the average growth rate of real per capita GDP between 1970 and 2005 and is in
percent. Average resource rent per capita growth is the mean growth rate of real resource rent per capita, over 1970 to 2005.
Volatility of resource rent is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the real resource rent per capita. For a list of the 112
countries included in the dataset see Table 1.
Table 3: Comparative Statistics, 1970-2005
Number of Fraser Fraser 2 Real GDP per
Country Group Countries Index Index Capita Growth
All Countries 112 5.82 5.44 1.67
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 32 6.72 7.74 2.36
and Development (OECD) Countries
Middle East and North African Countries 12 5.57 4.72 1.81
Organization of the Petroleum 8 5.37 4.02 1.52
Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Latin American Countries 18 5.64 4.22 1.30
African Countries 27 5.11 4.34 0.56
Notes: All numbers are averages over the period 1970-2005 across countries in each sub-group. See Table 1 for a list of the
di¤erent countries in each sub-group. For a description of the Fraser and Fraser 2 indices see Table 2.
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Table 4: Resource Rent Growth and Volatility
[1:1] [1:2] [1:3] [1:4]
Initial Output per Capita, in logs -1.085** -1.769** -2.069** -2.819***
(0.460) (0.812) (0.892) (0.750)
Resource Rent Growth 1.621*** 5.692*** 4.901*** 6.461***
(0.555) (1.241) (1.050) (1.728)







Investment 3.862*** 2.580** 1.486 0.832
(investment share of GDP, in logs) (0.656) (1.107) (0.903) (0.998)
Education -0.484 3.731 3.102 3.470
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (1.591) (2.355) (2.362) (2.828)
No. Countries/No. Observations 112/635 112/635 112/635 112/598
Specication tests (p-values)
(a) Hansen Test 0.237 0.382 0.138 0.123
(b) Serial Correlation
First-order 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001
Second-order 0.338 0.456 0.726 0.400
Notes: The dependant variable is the growth rate of output per capita. Time and xed e¤ects are included in all the regressions.
The estimation method is two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Units of observation is
non-overlapping ve-year averages over the period 1970-2005. Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coe¢ cients
in brackets. Symbols ***, **, and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and at 10% respectively. Source: Authorsestimations.
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Table 5: Resource Rent Volatility and Institutional Quality
[2:1] [2:2] [2:3] [2:4]
Initial Output per Capita, in logs -1.394* -1.822** -1.941*** -1.704*
(0.721) (0.753) (0.734) (0.923)
Resource Rent Growth 1.944*** 3.868*** 4.376*** 3.525***
(0.695) (1.335) (1.386) (1.266)
Resource Rent Volatility -4.739** -9.413*** -3.398* -8.295**
(2.334) (3.513) (1.721) (4.005)
Fraser 2.364** 1.417*
(1.009) (0.788)
Fraser  Resource Rent Volatility 0.845** 0.584*
(0.414) (0.320)
Fraser 2 0.186 -0.159
(0.346) (0.278)
Fraser 2  Resource Rent Volatility 1.621*** 1.385**
(0.604) (0.687)
Control variables
Investment -2.094 0.512 0.084 0.452
(investment share of GDP, in logs) (1.763) (1.317) (1.619) (0.859)
Education 1.861 3.556 5.931*** 4.110
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (2.302) (2.184) (1.920) (2.915)
Trade Openness -2.826 7.380
(trade volume/GDP, in logs) (3.860) (4.725)
Government Burden -3.694 1.169
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (3.180) (3.672)
Lack of Price Stability -0.089 -1.759
(log [100 + ination rate]) (2.339) (1.566)
No. Countries/No. Observations 112/598 112/598 107/538 107/538
Specication tests (p-values)
(a) Hansen Test 0.398 0.438 0.114 0.366
(b) Serial Correlation
First-order 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001
Second-order 0.956 0.685 0.904 0.692
Threshold analysis 5.61 5.81 5.82 5.99
Notes: The dependant variable is the growth rate of output per capita. Time and xed e¤ects are included in all the regressions.
The estimation method is two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Units of observation is
non-overlapping ve-year averages over the period 1970-2005. Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coe¢ cients
in brackets. Symbols ***, **, and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and at 10% respectively. Source: Authorsestimations.17
